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Executive Summary
Road privatization is a growing issue in the United States as politicians and transportation officials grapple with 
budget shortfalls. Toll road privatization 
takes two forms: the lease of existing toll 
roads to private operators and the con-
struction of new roads by private entities. 
In both instances, private investors are 
granted the right to raise and collect toll 
revenue, a right that can amount to billions 
of dollars in profits for the shareholders. 
Though these privatization deals seem 
to offer state officials a “quick fix,” they 
often pose long-term threats to the public 
interest. By privatizing roadways, officials 
hand over significant control over regional 
transportation policy to individuals who 
are accountable to their shareholders rather 
than the public. Additionally, the econom-
ics of these deals are such that the upfront 
concession payments are unlikely to match 
the long-term value of the higher tolls that 
will be paid by future generations and not 
collected for public uses. 
Public officials, therefore, should ap-
proach the idea of private toll roads with 
great caution, knowing that the short-term 
benefits are unlikely to outweigh the long-
term costs.
Toll road privatization is becoming 
increasingly prevalent in the United 
States.
• Between 1994 and early 2006, $21 
billion was paid for 43 highway facili-
ties in the United States using various 
“public-private partnership” models.
• By the end of 2008, 15 roads had 
been privatized in 10 different states 
– either through long-term highway 
lease agreements on existing highways 
or the construction of new private toll 
roads.
• Currently, approximately 79 roads in 
25 states are under consideration for 
some form of privatization.
• A few prominent examples of priva-
tized roads include: 
o	 The Indiana East-West Toll Road, 
which carries Interstate 90 approxi-
mately 150 miles across northern 
Indiana and is a critical link be-
tween Chicago and the eastern 
United States.
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o	 The Chicago Skyway, which links 
downtown Chicago with the Indi-
ana Toll Road.
o	 California’s SR 91 Express Lanes, 
which were originally built by a 
private entity to provide a speedier 
connection between Orange and 
Riverside counties.
Though privatization may offer 
short-term relief to transportation bud-
get woes, it often has grave implications 
for the public.
• The public will not receive full 
value for its future toll revenues. 
The upfront payments that states re-
ceive are often worth far less than the 
value of future toll revenue from the 
road. Analysis of the Indiana and Chi-
cago deals found that private investors 
would recoup their investments in less 
than 20 years. Given that these deals 
are for 75 and 99 years, respectively, 
the public clearly received far less for 
their assets than they are truly worth.
• The public loses control over 
transportation policy. Private road 
concessions in particular result in a 
more fragmented road network, less 
ability to prevent toll traffic from be-
ing diverted into local communities, 
Figure ES-1. Privatization Projects Completed, Underway or Proposed, by State
For a detailed listing of completed and proposed privatization projects by state, please download 
Appendices B and C of this report, available at www.uspirg.org/road-appendix.
Executive Summary 3
and often the requirement to com-
pensate private operators for actions 
that reduce traffic on the road, such 
as constructing or upgrading a nearby 
competing transportation facility.
• Public officials cannot ensure that 
privatization contracts will be 
fair and effective when leases last 
for multiple generations. No army 
of lawyers and accountants can fully 
anticipate future public needs. Trans-
urban, for example, has control over 
the Pocahontas Parkway in Virginia 
for 99 years. 
In order to protect the public inter-
est, public officials must adhere to six 
basic principles in all road privatization 
agreements:
• The public should retain control over 
decisions about transportation  
planning and management. 
• The public must receive fair value so 
future toll revenues are not be sold off 
at a discount. 
• No deal should last longer than 30 
years because of uncertainty over fu-
ture conditions and because the risks 
of a bad deal grow exponentially over 
time. 
• Contracts should require state-of-the-
art maintenance and safety standards 
instead of statewide minimums. 
• There must be complete transparency 
to ensure proper public vetting of 
privatization proposals.
• There must be full accountability in 
which the legislature must approve the 
terms of a final deal, not just approve 
that a deal be negotiated. 
4 Private Roads, Public Costs
Debates about the privatization of public services often devolve into ideological squabbles about the 
proper role of government versus the 
private sector. Advocates of privatization 
point to examples of government waste and 
bureaucratic inertia to make the argument 
that the private sector can deliver services 
more efficiently. On the other side, op-
ponents of privatization offer stories of 
corrupt contracting and the insensitivity 
of private entities to the broader public 
interest to argue for broader government 
involvement.
Yet, all but the most extreme advocates 
of privatization will acknowledge that there 
are some circumstances in which govern-
ment must provide certain services directly. 
Few, for example, would feel comfortable 
taking bottom-line responsibility for the 
delivery of “justice” away from our court 
system and giving it to a private, for-profit 
corporation. Similarly, few opponents of 
privatization would insist that government 
should never contract out to the private sec-
tor – whether for maintenance of the copi-
ers in government offices or the production 
of concrete for government buildings.
In other words, when it comes to the 
question of public versus private provision 
of government services, it is a matter of 
where best to draw the line. There will 
always be a role for both public and private 
entities in meeting America’s transporta-
tion needs. It is up to elected officials to 
find the right balance to ensure that the 
public gets the value, efficiency and safety 
it deserves from its transportation network 
– particularly at a time when our transpor-
tation system is in dire need of repair and 
when resources are scarce.
The task of government officials and the 
public is to evaluate privatization proposals 
rigorously – without ideological blinders 
– to ensure that any such deals benefit the 
public interest. 
Public officials must ask tough questions 
if they are to safeguard the public interest. 
In this paper, we evaluate one particular 
form of public-private partnership in trans-
portation – toll-road privatization – and 
suggest a series of guidelines public officials 
should adopt to ensure that any potential 
private toll road deals benefit the public. 
We hope this paper will help public of-
ficials navigate the difficult decisions sur-
rounding toll-road privatization and make 
the right decisions to benefit the public. 
Introduction
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Privatization:  
Clarifying the Term
Government, the media, and the pri-vate infrastructure industry use a variety of terms to describe efforts 
to transfer public services to the private 
sector. As one long-time scholar of infra-
structure privatization at Harvard notes, 
privatization has been packaged under a 
variety of names. 
Governments have experimented with 
many variants of privatization, often 
coining special terms—such as “peo-
plisation” (Sri Lanka), “capitalization” 
(Bolivia), or “equitization” (Viet-
nam)—to distinguish them from the 
standard fare. And many consultants 
now prefer to use the term “public-
private partnerships” to emphasize 
that a wide variety of forms of pub-
lic-private collaboration is possible. 
Such changes in terminology may 
be useful, but they do not eliminate 
the basic problem of persuading the 
public that the terms of the partner-
ship are fair.1
The term “public-private partnership” 
is particularly ubiquitous, and woefully 
imprecise. Virtually all public programs 
have always involved some kind of partner-
ship between public and private sectors. 
Medicare is a partnership between public 
financing and services by private medical 
providers, for instance. All government 
departments of transportation likewise 
have a long tradition of using private ven-
dors for various kinds of service provision. 
Even transactions between two private 
companies involve some kind of partner-
ship with the public sector to underwrite 
risks, define property rights, and enforce 
contracts. Since “public-private partner-
ship” can mean virtually anything, the 
term is of little descriptive value.
The term “privatization” is more pre-
cise, denoting the transfer of traditionally 
public services or property to the private 
sector. 
What Is Toll Road Privatization?
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Practical  
Considerations:  
When Does  
Privatization  
Make Sense?
Practically speaking, privatization makes 
sense for the public when certain condi-
tions are met.2
• First, privatization works best when 
private companies have a proven 
comparative advantage over gov-
ernment agencies in providing a par-
ticular good or service. For instance, 
at least before recycling programs 
were created, a variety of exhaustive 
studies concluded that because smaller 
municipalities lack economies of scale, 
those that used competitive contract-
ing for household garbage collection 
had lower costs than comparable mu-
nicipalities that used public agencies 
for collection.3
• Second, the services that are priva-
tized must be well defined, with 
clear criteria for the evaluation of 
success or failure. It is less prob-
lematic, for example, to contract for 
private delivery of a ton of cement or 
for office windows to be washed each 
Friday than it would be to contract out 
“justice” from the courts.
• Third, privatization only succeeds 
when private contractors’ perfor-
mance is disciplined by ongoing 
competition. There must be multiple 
contractors capable of submitting 
bids, and contracts must be for a short 
enough period to allow for unsatisfac-
tory performers to be readily  
replaced.4 
• Finally, privatization works best when 
the government officials making the 
decision to privatize can be held  
accountable for the results of a  
deal.
Defining Toll Road  
Privatization
In this report, we focus on evaluating 
proposals for toll road privatization to 
determine whether privatization of toll 
roads makes sense according to the criteria 
described above. 
Private toll road deals can involve lesser 
or greater degrees of privatization. On the 
lesser side of the spectrum are small chang-
es such as the hiring of private contractors 
to mow grass or operate toll-collection sys-
tems. On the other side of the spectrum is 
the construction of wholly privately owned 
and operated highways. 
?
Toll road privatization: When an existing roadway is leased to 
a private company for a concession fee, or when a private entity 
finances new road construction in exchange for the right to operate 
and collect rising tolls on that road.
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This paper focuses on two types of ar-
rangements: when an existing roadway is 
leased to a private company for a conces-
sion fee; and when a private entity finances 
new road construction in exchange for the 
right to operate that route over a specified 
period of time. These arrangements share 
two characteristics. First, the government 
transfers rights tantamount to ownership 
to a private entity. Second, the private 
entity receives access to toll revenues and 
the right to raise tolls. 
There are many types of arrangements 
that fall just outside of this definition 
of toll road privatization. For example, 
governments have signed contracts with 
private entities to perform virtually all of 
the services a government would perform 
in building and operating a highway 
– ranging from design to financing to 
ongoing maintenance – but without grant-
ing the private entities direct access to toll 
revenues. In these cases, government still 
maintains ownership of the road as well as 
a direct ability to withhold public funds 
from the private operator if the terms of 
the contract are not upheld. 
One example of such a deal is an 
agreement reached between the state of 
Florida and the Spanish company, ACS, 
for the construction and operation of 
express toll lanes alongside I-595. Under 
the arrangement, Florida will make annual 
“availability payments” to ACS over a 
35-year span to compensate the company 
for the cost of building and operating 
the highway. The payments to ACS are 
incentive-based, but the state of Florida 
retains the power to set toll rates and 
collect the revenue.5 The Florida deal, 
while clearly a “public-private partnership” 
with a strong private-sector component, 
does not fit strictly within the definition of 
toll road privatization used in this report.
Another complicating factor in defining 
privatization projects is the use of non-
profit intermediaries to secure preferential 
treatment for privatization arrangements 
under the U.S. tax code, IRS Revenue 
Ruling 63-20. Local governments have 
traditionally issued tax-exempt debt in 
order to build schools, court houses or 
hospitals. Today, however, private com-
panies establish these so-called “63-20” 
“Availability Payments” Versus Toll Concessions
By retaining the public’s right to set and collect tolls while more narrowly pre-scribing the private role, contracts that pay “availability payments” to private 
operators have a number of advantages over private toll concessions. The public 
retains greater control over transportation policy and will not be subject to non-
compete clauses. Nor is the public liable to be sued for compensation when policies 
reduce toll traffic. Incentive clauses create a direct economic incentive to keep lanes 
available and in good repair.
Availability payment deals still have many potential problems. Higher private 
borrowing costs mean that deals will still tend to lose the public money over the 
long term; and contract incentives still cannot anticipate future public needs. The 
public interest protections listed in this report would also apply to deals that involve 
availability payments. Moreover, the payments should not be overly generous com-
pared to what it would cost the public to make these lanes available themselves.
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non-profits so that privatized projects can 
achieve the same favorable credit terms as 
public agencies. In order to establish a 63-
20, the local government must approve its 
charter and the issue of its debt, giving the 
government title to its assets after the debt 
is repaid. However, a loophole in the law 
allows an arrangement in which the gov-
ernment can then effectively disown the 
non-profit, which limits the government’s 
ability to be involved in the operations of 
the company. By law, 63-20s cannot make 
a profit, but private companies can cir-
cumvent this restriction by receiving their 
compensation through development fees 
that are charged for consulting services. 
Though obviously an indirect way of earn-
ing a return on investment, this contriv-
ance has nonetheless become a common 
way for private companies to seek publicly 
subsidized capital, and projects financed by 
63-20s can fit into the definition of “priva-
tization” used in this report.6
Describing proposed toll road privati-
zation projects with exactitude is difficult 
because the precise relationship between 
a government and a private entity in oper-
ating a road may not be determined until 
a contract is finalized. As a result, while 
we have attempted in this paper to use a 
relatively narrow definition of privatization 
for completed projects, our list of proposed 
projects includes a much broader range of 
potential arrangements. While some of 
these roads may end up as fully privatized 
highways, others will not. Including the 
broad range of potential projects is valuable 
despite this problem because it conveys the 
variety of potential privatization projects 
across the country and the potential stakes 
involved for the public. 
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The Current State of  
Privatization
Though rare only a decade ago, road privatization has become increasingly common in the United States. Cur-
rently, 24 states and Puerto Rico have leg-
islation or regulations authorizing the use 
of public-private partnerships in highway 
construction and operation.7 
As of the end of 2008, 15 roads had 
been privatized, and approximately 79 
roads were either in the process of being 
built by private entities or being consid-
ered for privatization. (See “Tallying Up 
the Number of Privatization Projects.”) 
This privatization activity represents a 
substantial amount of money: from 1994 
The Rise in Toll Road Privatization
Tallying Up the Number of Privatization Projects
In counting the number of privatization projects across the United States, we attempted to be as inclusive as possible, including projects at every stage of 
consideration from idle discussion to full-fledged proposals. Information about 
privatization proposals was gleaned from a variety of sources, which are described 
in detail in Appendices B and C to this report, which can be downloaded from 
www.uspirg.org/road-appendix.
The privatization field is extremely fluid. Some proposed projects may have been 
dropped; others may have been put on hold. New projects may also have been pro-
posed since the research for this paper was completed. Moreover, some proposals, 
particularly at the early stages, are vague about the role of private investment and 
involvement. 
In other words, the number of privatization projects described here represents a snap-
shot in time and a relatively broad view of what constitutes a privatization project.
CONSTRUCTION 
AHEAD
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to early 2006, $21 billion was paid during 
this time period for 43 highway facilities 
in the United States using various models 
(including models other than those consid-
ered in this report).8 These numbers may 
rise as more states attempt to overcome 
severe short-term budget deficits and meet 
unfunded transportation needs.9 
Common in the less-developed world 
for the last couple of decades, infrastruc-
ture privatization had not taken root in the 
United States until recently.10 During the 
1990s, infrastructure privatization became 
increasingly popular in East Asia and in 
Latin America, where Enron was a major 
investor. In those countries, unlike in the 
United States, access to long-term capital 
was a major problem for governments 
seeking to build infrastructure. Accord-
ing to World Bank records, infrastructure 
privatization outside of the United States 
reached a peak of over $110 billion per year 
in 1997 and 1998.11 
Many infrastructure privatization deals 
became high-profile failures. Two dozen 
private toll roads went bankrupt in Mexico 
after 1994. The Thai government seized 
one railroad that had been in private hands 
in 1993. Britain renationalized its rail sys-
tem from Railtrack, the private company 
that had purchased the rail system, in 
2001.12 A World Bank study of over 1,000 
infrastructure projects in Latin America 
and the Caribbean between 1982 and 
2000 found that 55 percent of privatiza-
tion contracts in transportation and 75 
For a detailed listing of completed and proposed privatization projects by state, please download 
Appendices B and C of this report, available at www.uspirg.org/road-appendix.
Figure 1. Privatization Projects Completed, Underway or Proposed, by State
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percent in water and sewer had been rene-
gotiated, most during the first few years.13 
Twenty-one toll road projects in Hungary, 
Indonesia, Mexico, and Thailand were sub-
sequently taken over by the government.14 
By the early years of the current decade, the 
volume of privatization deals had returned 
to the lower levels of the early 1990s.
Why Privatization 
Proposals Have  
Become More  
Common
Despite these experiences, privatization 
is becoming increasingly common in the 
United States as state governments attempt 
to overcome severe budget shortfalls. This 
trend has also been encouraged by federal 
policies meant to facilitate privatization 
agreements.
Budget Squeeze for  
Transportation
Roads across the country are under strain 
due to growing congestion and years of 
insufficient investment in maintenance. 
The American Society of Civil Engineers 
has graded the overall condition of the 
nation’s infrastructure a “D,” and predicts 
that $200 billion per year must be spent to 
maintain and improve the quality of the 
nation’s roads and bridges.15 This level of 
investment will put a tremendous strain on 
state budgets, already experiencing short-
falls due to declining revenue.
Part of the problem is perverse rules 
that discourage investment in maintenance 
while encouraging construction of new 
roads.16 For example, in Massachusetts, 
the funds for highway maintenance come 
from the Department of Transportation’s 
budget, while money for major repairs is 
taken from the Division of Capital Asset 
Management, a separate agency. This set-
up clearly creates an incentive for the de-
partment of transportation to under-invest 
in road maintenance, because a separate 
agency will be responsible for repairs.17 
Additionally, even when federal funds for 
maintenance are provided, public officials 
often divert them to the construction of 
new roadways, as a ribbon-cutting cer-
emony tends to carry more political weight 
than maintenance projects. The result is 
deferred maintenance which necessitates 
expensive repairs in the future.
State governments today face immedi-
ate budget crunches due to rising health, 
pension, and unemployment costs, coupled 
with declining revenue. State legislators, 
who have already closed $40 billion in 
budget gaps, face an additional $131 billion 
shortfall between now and the end of the 
2010 fiscal year.18 According to William T. 
Pound, executive director of the National 
Council of State Legislatures, “These 
budget gaps are approaching those seen 
in the last recession, which were the worst 
since World War II, and show every sign 
of growing larger.”19
Rising costs and declining revenues 
limit states’ ability to use general revenue 
funds to address transportation needs. 
Meanwhile, gas taxes, the traditional 
mainstay of transportation funding, have 
not kept up with inflation. For example, 
states’ gas taxes lost 43 percent of their 
value during the 1970s, 80s, and 90s.20 The 
federal gas tax, last increased in 1993, has 
done only slightly better. To complicate 
matters, Americans have begun to drive 
less in the past year, further reducing gas 
tax revenue.
Furthermore, over the past few years, 
construction costs have been rising due to 
rapid inflation in the price of construction 
materials and the increased consolidation 
of the construction industry. Though the 
recent financial crisis has led to a deflation 
EXPRESSWAY 
AHEAD
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in construction costs, the historical trends 
have contributed to the current shortfall in 
transportation budgets. Over the past five 
years, the cost of materials for highway and 
street construction, as measured by the 
Producer Price Index (PPI), has increased 
by 63 percent, a rate far higher than the 
general rate of inflation over the same 
period.21 In particular the cost of crude 
oil has led to very high costs for asphalt 
and diesel, two of the most basic construc-
tion materials used in highway and street 
construction. 
While material costs have been increas-
ing, the number of bids that states receive 
for contracts has been decreasing. While 
not as significant a factor as the cost of 
materials, there has been a noticeable 
trend among states indicating that fewer 
contractors are responding to requests for 
proposals. According to a survey of the 
nation’s state transportation agencies, the 
reasons for this include 1) increased con-
solidation; 2) increased work with the same 
number of contractors; 3) downsizing of the 
construction workforce; and 4) increased 
technical requirements in contracts.22 As 
fewer contractors respond to competitive 
bid requests, states will be limited in their 
choices to find the best contractor for the 
lowest price, and prices will increase. Over 
time this could become a more serious 
factor behind highway construction cost 
inflation. 
As a result of revenue shortfalls and 
historically rising costs, states are increas-
ingly unable to build and maintain high-
ways at traditional levels. According to the 
American Association of State Highway 
and Transportation Officials, the federal 
Transportation Trust Fund, used for state 
and local projects, is projected to run into 
shortfall during 2009 and will need to re-
duce payments by 42 percent the following 
year unless new revenues are obtained.23 
Many state-level transportation trust funds 
are also forecast to run into shortfall in 
coming years.24
In the context of great investment needs 
and stagnant revenues, the huge upfront 
payouts of toll road privatization have obvi-
ous short-term appeal.
Political Benefits of Privatization
Privatization of roads offers elected of-
ficials political benefits beyond the ability 
to avoid potentially unpopular tax increases 
to pay for transportation. In the short 
term, privatization promises a huge budget 
windfall, especially for privatization of 
existing roads, which creates budget slack 
and an ability to dedicate resources to other 
favored projects. New private roads offer 
special opportunities for credit-taking and 
ribbon cutting ceremonies. In either case, 
the long-term financial downside, particu-
larly the loss of toll funds and rising toll 
rates paid by drivers, often is overshadowed 
by the short-term windfall.25 For instance, 
the Indiana Toll Road deal used a 75-year 
lease to finance a 10-year transportation 
plan. Whatever structural budget shortfalls 
Indiana faced before the deal will return 
in the 11th  year , but the state will need to 
face these shortfalls without revenue from 
its toll road. 
Privatization may also be attractive to 
elected officials because it gives them po-
litical cover for toll hikes they fear will be 
unpopular. Potential investors claim that 
by outsourcing toll collection to a private 
company, drivers’ anger will not be direct-
ed at the politicians who authorized the toll 
hikes. Moody’s bond rating agency, after 
conceding that governments can generate 
these same upfront payments by borrow-
ing against future toll collections without 
privatization, offers the counterpoint 
that, “If they pursue the option [without 
privatizing], governmental authorities 
must take responsibility for their own toll 
raising decisions, rather than distancing 
themselves from these decisions through 
a long-term concession to a private en-
tity.” 26 Fitch bond rating service, similarly, 
lists as a merit of toll road privatization, the 
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ability to “distance government from toll 
increases.” The report explains that, “the 
political risk related to toll rate increases 
could be minimized by transferring the 
authority within an overall rate-setting 
framework to the private sector.”27
Federal Rules Promote  
Privatization
Policies by the Internal Revenue Service 
and particularly the Department of Trans-
portation (DOT) have also promoted road 
privatization. 
The tax code encourages privatization in 
a number of often unintended ways. As dis-
cussed earlier, many private projects take 
advantage of the IRS 63-20 rule to utilize 
benefits meant for nonprofit organizations. 
The federal tax code also treats private 
holders of road concession deals that last 
longer than the expected life of a road 
(normally 40 years or more) as owners for 
tax purposes and allows them to depreciate 
the value of those assets at an accelerated 
rate of 15 years. Senator Jeff Bingaman has 
described this as, “the tax tail wagging the 
dog: Exceptionally long leases in order to 
recover capital outlays on an accelerated 
schedule.”31 As an overview study by the 
Transportation Research Board of the 
National Academies concludes, “This 
amounts to a government subsidy to the 
concessionaire that may significantly re-
duce corporate taxes if the project proves 
profitable.”32
The U.S. Department of Transporta-
tion also subsidizes private road projects 
in a number of ways. The Transportation 
Aggressive Lobbying by the Private Toll Road Industry
Politicians across the country have been lobbied extensively by the toll road industry hoping to profit off the public’s infrastructure. These lobbyists have 
made sizeable campaign contributions to numerous politicians across the country, 
hoping to encourage the adoption of road privatization projects.28 Though legal, 
these contributions raise the question of whether politicians can make an unbiased 
decision in the public’s interest when so much money is at stake. The following 
provides a sample of some of these contributions:
• Zachry Construction Corporation, a company competing for Trans Texas 
Corridor projects, contributed $888,996 to Texas politicians from 2003 to 
2008.29
• A2 Transportation Partners, a consortium bidding to operate the Alligator 
Alley, contributed $100,000 to the Florida Democratic Party in 2002, and 
another $154,000 in 2008.
• Abertis Infrastructures, a Spanish based road management company, spent 
over $250 million in 2007 and $160 million in 2008 on lobbying efforts at the 
federal level.
• UBS, which was part of the financing team involved in the proposed bid 
for the Pennsylvania Turnpike, donated $13,000 to Governor Ed Rendell of 
Pennsylvania.30
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Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act 
(TIFIA), passed in 1998, established funds 
for the federal DOT to spend on secured 
(direct) loans, loan guarantees, and standby 
lines of credit to attract private investment 
in surface transportation infrastructure.33 
The TIFIA website lists $5.8 billion in past 
or pending financing provided by the de-
partment as of February 2009, with most of 
it devoted to highway projects.34 The DOT 
also publishes model legislation for states 
and a newsletter to encourage privatization 
of roads.35
The biggest incentives are for private 
“green field” deals in which companies 
construct a new toll road and then oper-
ate it and collect tolls. The federal DOT 
allocates over $2 billion per year in credit 
that can be used to subsidize private bor-
rowing for highway and surface freight 
transfer projects by exempting private 
bonds from taxes. The DOT also grants 
private projects special federal waivers 
that suspend normal requirements on 
contracting, project finance, compliance 
with environmental requirements, and 
right-of-way acquisition. For example, 
Oregon and Texas both received federal 
waivers allowing them to begin negotiating 
contracts before the environmental review 
process had been completed.36
In addition to passing favorable regula-
tions, the federal DOT under the Bush 
Administration actively lobbied state 
governments to approve privatization 
agreements. Then-Secretary of Transpor-
tation Mary Peters traveled to numerous 
states to encourage their use of private 
investment, and tolling became an official 
key component of the DOT’s congestion 
mitigation initiatives. In one instance, the 
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) 
even threatened Texas for pulling out of an 
agreement with a private company. The 
Texas Department of Transportation (Tx-
DOT) initially accepted a proposal from 
Cintra, a private company, to construct 
and operate State Highway 121. However, 
due to significant public opposition to the 
project, TxDOT eventually rejected the 
proposal in favor of a bid by the North 
Texas Toll Authority (NTTA), a public 
entity. The deal with the NTTA was esti-
mated by some analysts to save the public 
$2.3 billion versus the bid from the private 
vendor.37 In response, the FHWA sent 
a letter to TxDOT threatening to with-
hold future federal funds for the project. 
FHWA argued that acceptance of NTTA’s 
bid violated federal regulations requiring 
a “fair and open” competitive process and 
rules prohibiting public entities from bid-
ding against private companies. While the 
FHWA eventually backed down from its 
threat, many in Texas saw the exchange 
as an unjustified use of federal powers to 
influence state decisions.38
In a more recent signal of its support for 
privatization, the Federal Highway Admin-
istration issued a rule in the Federal Regis-
ter requiring any future reorganization of 
public agencies to be justified on market 
concession terms. What this essentially 
means is that any time a state agency at-
tempts to reorganize or transfer authority 
over a toll road, it must first undergo an 
analysis to determine what price a private 
company would bid to operate the highway 
under a concession agreement. When this 
concession price is determined, the public 
entity would be required to charge that 
amount to the other agency that is tak-
ing over the roadway. Thus, if TxDOT 
wanted to transfer authority over a road to 
the NTTA because it thought the NTTA 
was better suited to operate that highway, 
TxDOT would be forced to charge NTTA 
an amount equivalent to what a private 
company would bid. After a large number 
of private agencies and other stakeholders 
voiced concern during the public comment 
period, the U.S. DOT revised the rule to 
give agencies wide latitude to determine 
the criteria for market valuation. While 
the immediate effect of this ruling has 
been muted, it nonetheless set a troubling 
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precedent by establishing private conces-
sion deals as the standard.
The Potential for Low-Risk Profits
In addition to the federal subsidies for 
green field deals, a number of factors 
make road privatization attractive to in-
vestors. One is the relative reliability of 
toll revenues. Compared to stocks and 
other investments, toll road privatization 
is considered a relatively secure source of 
long-term revenue. In addition, once a toll 
road concession is signed, it is very difficult 
to undo under U.S. contract laws. Toll 
profits reduce investors’ portfolio risk as 
well, because the returns on these invest-
ments depend chiefly on traffic flow, which 
has historically been “recession-proof.” 
Though there have been signs recently of 
reduced driving, toll roads are still consid-
ered a safe investment, especially in light of 
the current problems on Wall Street.
There is some evidence that the reputa-
tion of infrastructure investments as “safe” 
may be overstated. Many new private toll 
roads have underperformed, and there have 
been accusations of conflicts of interest by 
companies which analyze these deals and 
prepare profit forecasts. In fact, a study of 
10 private U.S. toll roads built since the 
mid-1990s found that half have not met 
their traffic projections.39 
Additionally, private infrastructure 
deals often involve heavily leveraged debt 
and the trading of long-term risk, much 
like the mortgage industry in recent years. 
Some analysts worry that such a model 
will not be sustainable.40 A recent analysis 
by PricewaterhouseCoopers describes the 
destabilizing pattern of leveraging debt and 
selling the risk to others that characterize 
both the private infrastructure market 
and the now-infamous subprime mortgage 
industry:
In the early 2000s, an increas-
ing number of large project finance 
lenders aggressively cut back on their 
project and infrastructure finance 
lending business or amalgamated 
them into their wider leverage fi-
nance business. This led to the now 
Governor Corzine of New Jersey decided not to privatize or lease the Atlantic City Expressway, 
Garden State Parkway, and New Jersey Turnpike (pictured here). Governor Corzine previously 
served as CEO for Goldman Sachs, which advised structuring of the road privatization deals in 
Indiana and Chicago. (Photo: Mark Gordon)
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well-practiced strategy of “originate 
and distribute,” often cycled through 
the dedicated securitization struc-
tures. … These were initially used 
to demonetize a bank’s balance sheet 
but then took on a life of their own 
as they became conduits for banks 
to originate business, take a fee, and 
then sell on the exposure.41
Despite these concerns, there remains 
the perception that infrastructure invest-
ments are safe and sustainable. 
Vast Amounts of 
Private Money Are 
Seeking Toll Road  
Investments
With all these factors favoring toll road 
deals, it is no surprise that private investors 
have been trying to take advantage of the 
profit opportunities. Private infrastructure 
investment funds raised $25 billion in 
2008, up tenfold from just $2.4 billion in 
2004 (though down from the peak invest-
ment of $34 billion in 2007).42 A total of 
77 such funds were active in the market 
at the end of 2008, seeking $92 billion in 
capital. 43 
The recent financial crisis has caused 
investment in private infrastructure funds 
to dry up, and has eroded the stock prices 
of many funds. Yet, some fund managers 
believe that the financial crisis will be 
a boon to infrastructure investment in 
the long term. As Matthew Vickerstaff, 
the global head of infrastructure and as-
set based finance at Societe General in 
New York, explained in BNET Financial 
Services, “The current crisis is good for 
infrastructure funding because there will 
be increasing pressure on states, cities and 
provinces to balance their budgets. They 
will need to spend both for social and 
transportation infrastructure. They’ll need 
private money and private-public part-
nerships.”44 Thus, the number of private 
road deals may increase as state and local 
governments become more desperate for 
short-term infusions of cash.
$
The Pitfalls of Toll Road Privatization 17
The economics and governance of privatized roads are highly problem-atic. For existing roads, outsourcing 
borrowing against future toll revenue to 
a private entity is likely to generate less 
money than a public entity could produce 
with the same tolls. This is the case be-
cause a private toll road operator will have 
higher borrowing costs and must divert 
some revenues to shareholder profits. In 
addition to these fiscal problems, long-term 
road contracts pose other serious threats 
to the public interest. These include frag-
mentation and loss of public control over 
transportation policy, and the inability to 
plan for future public needs in contracts 
that stretch over multiple decades.
Loss of Public Control
Transportation policy has tremendous im-
pacts on quality of life, health, and the cost 
of living. It determines the level of traffic 
congestion and air pollution, the safety and 
quality of the roads, the many costs of driv-
ing and car ownership, the availability of 
high-quality and affordable public transit 
alternatives, and the development of future 
land-use patterns. What may seem benefi-
cial from a narrow profit perspective does 
not necessarily benefit the broader public 
interest.45 Public control of key toll roads 
is therefore necessary to ensure coherent 
transportation planning and policy making 
over long periods of time. 
Any driver knows how events that take 
place on one road affect other connecting 
and alternative routes. Thus, toll rates, 
maintenance and safety standards, as well as 
congestion on a toll road affect the number 
of cars using alternative means of trans-
portation, including local roads and public 
transit. Decisions about how to operate and 
manage major roadways actually create traf-
fic policy for an entire jurisdiction.
New toll roads or additional lanes can 
have particularly profound consequences 
for future land-use and development 
practices as well as for a state’s energy and 
environmental policies, including efforts to 
reduce oil dependence, improve air qual-
ity, and curb emissions of global warming 
pollution. 
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Road privatization experiences across 
the country have shown that a private 
operator’s profit motives lead to different 
management decisions than government 
might pursue. Examples from recent road 
privatization projects illustrate these po-
tential dangers. 
Non-compete Clauses
Toll road investors want assurances that 
traffic levels will meet or exceed predic-
tions, even in the event of toll increases. 
Some privatization contracts therefore 
explicitly limit states’ ability to improve 
or expand nearby transportation facilities. 
The U.S. Department of Transportation, 
in its Report to Congress on Public Private 
Partnerships (December 2004), strongly 
supported the inclusion of such “non-
compete” clauses to help attract private 
investment. 
In Colorado, one deal went so far as 
to require adjacent municipalities to add 
stop lights and reduce speed limits on 
local roads as a way to reduce potential 
competition.46 Though the operator of the 
road was technically a public entity, it was 
heavily financed by private investors who 
demanded protection of future revenues. 
California, which used a private concession 
deal to create new toll lanes in the median 
of State Road 91, was subsequently forced 
to buy back the road because non-compete 
clauses prevented the state from improv-
ing the corridor and led to high-profile 
litigation. Similarly, Indiana is prevented 
from building a four-lane, divided highway 
more than 20 miles long (or expanding a 
current highway to Interstate standards) 
within 10 miles of the East-West Toll 
Road for at least 55 years without providing 
compensation to the toll road operator for 
lost revenue.47
Non-compete clauses are included in 
many privatization contracts to protect the 
investors. A report by the Texas Legislative 
Study Committee on Private Participation 
in Toll Contracts claims that non-compete 
provisions are necessary for private entities 
to be able to sell bonds. If such a provision 
were not included, the state could eas-
ily build a free, competing roadway that 
would divert traffic from the private toll 
road, eventually forcing the company into 
bankruptcy. This actually occurred in New 
Jersey with the Beesley’s Point Bridge. The 
private bridge was originally built in 1927, 
but in the 1950s a competing public bridge 
was constructed only 300 yards away. Af-
ter the construction of the public bridge, 
revenues from the Beesley’s Point Bridge 
plummeted, and the bridge was eventually 
closed to traffic in June 2004. Recently, 
Cape May County took over the bridge.48
Even when privatization agreements do 
not include an explicit non-compete clause, 
there may be an understanding between 
the state and the private operator. For 
example, Virginia had an “understanding” 
with the private operator of the Dulles 
Greenway not to make improvements on 
competing roads ahead of schedule (though 
VDOT eventually reneged on this under-
standing).49 Concession agreements in both 
South Carolina (Southern Connector) and 
Virginia (Pocahontas Parkway) include 
vague language that prohibits the state 
DOTs from pursuing activities that could 
be considered competitive in nature.50
Compensation Clauses 
In place of non-compete clauses, many 
agreements now include compensation 
provisions requiring the state to com-
pensate the private operator if its actions 
negatively affect toll revenues. The Indiana 
deal, for example, requires the state to pay 
investors compensation for reduced toll 
revenue when the state performs construc-
tion, such as adding an exit or building a 
mass transit line down the median. This 
compensation would add significantly to 
the cost of construction, and the state 
could potentially not afford to do the work 
it would otherwise perform. As an added 
complication, the exact level of these fu-
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ture payments might be subject to dispute 
and lawsuits. Already, the state of Indiana 
has had to reimburse the private opera-
tor $447,000 for waiving toll collections 
to assist in evacuations from flooding in 
September 2008. Appendix A provides ad-
ditional examples of these agreements.
These compensation clauses are in-
imical to comprehensive transportation 
planning. Transportation policy should 
be made according to what is best for the 
public, not conditioned by avoiding extra 
payments to a private operator.
Profit-Driven Transportation  
Planning 
Some privatization deals include monetary 
incentives for the state to divert traffic to 
the toll roads or decrease safety standards 
in an effort to boost profits. Decisions to 
build new roads are supposed to be made in 
accordance with long-term regional plans. 
The Texas contract with Cintra-Zachry for 
SH-130 contains incentives for the state to 
raise the speed limit on the private road. 
The contract says that if the speed limit 
remains at 70 mph, the state will receive 
4.65 percent of revenue up to a certain 
threshold. However, if the state raises the 
speed limit to 80 mph, it would receive 9 
percent of the revenues.51 Though state 
officials have maintained they will not base 
speed limit decisions on monetary gain, 
this clause does create a strong incentive 
for the state to toss aside safety, energy, and 
environmental policy in favor of cash.
Dangerous and Costly  
Traffic Diversions
The goal of private toll operators is to find 
the right balance of toll rates and traffic 
to produce the maximum amount of rev-
enue.52 Private toll operators can generally 
increase revenues by raising toll rates, even 
though the higher rates will cause some 
truck and car drivers  to choose alternative 
routes. For the private operator, the ad-
ditional toll rates may more than make up 
for income lost from diverted vehicles. But 
from the public perspective, the diverted 
traffic may clog local roads, increasing 
congestion and pollution in local com-
munities. There was substantial traffic 
diversion, particularly of trucks, after the 
1991 New Jersey Turnpike toll hike. New 
Jersey responded by rolling back some of 
the toll hike for trucks to entice them back 
onto the Turnpike, a move that would not 
have been possible under privatization, at 
least not without paying the private firm for 
the lost projected revenue. From a private 
toll road operator’s perspective, gridlock 
and pollution on local roads may actually 
be desirable because drivers will be more 
likely to pay still-higher tolls. A study by 
researchers at Penn State University and 
Wayne State University found that the 
private operation of toll roads could lead 
to increased accidents and maintenance on 
nearby public roads and lower quality of 
life for residents on parallel roadways. The 
study also found large economic losses to 
nearby communities associated with diver-
sion of truck traffic.53
It is important to recognize just how 
much control over transportation policy 
is granted to private operators through 
toll hike schedules for private operators. 
If the rules for increasing toll rates under 
the Chicago Skyway toll road deal had ap-
plied to New York’s Holland Tunnel since 
its inception, that roadway could presently 
charge a one-way toll of more than $180.54 
As a practical matter, an operator would be 
unlikely to charge that price because nearly 
all drivers would instead take alternate 
routes. But the operator would be free to 
charge whatever the market would bear to 
maximize profits. Most agreements allow 
toll increases to match inflation or GDP, 
whichever is higher. This may not sound 
excessive. But according to Professors 
Peter Swan and Michael Belzer, nominal 
GDP has increased an average of over 7 
percent for the past 50 years. Thus, with 
this average GDP growth, truck tolls could 
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increase 3,976 percent over the life of the 
roadway under the terms of the Indiana 
Toll Road agreement.55 Moreover, in order 
to maximize profits, the toll operator can 
also offer discounts to particular types of 
motorists and encourage traffic between 
certain exits or at certain times. Together, 
these provisions enable the operator to 
dictate who drives on the toll roads and at 
what times.
Inability to Guarantee  
State-of-the-art Safety and  
Maintenance Standards 
The public may want major traffic arteries 
to have cutting-edge safety technologies 
and traffic management. Private road 
operators, on the other hand, have an in-
centive to reduce costs by avoiding these 
outlays. Private investors want protection 
against large increases in safety or main-
tenance costs. As a result, road contracts 
typically require private operators to meet 
only generally applicable safety standards. 
In order to obtain state-of-the-art highway 
safety, Indiana must pay the additional 
cost of constructing and maintaining the 
road to the higher standards, as well as to 
compensate the private company for any 
lost tolls caused by the construction. 
In the future, new standards may include 
things such as new surfaces, embedded 
road sensors, or technologies that are not 
currently envisioned. The Chicago De-
partment of Transportation, for example, 
has recently conducted a study which found 
that using a new type of road surface that 
includes recycled rubber is slightly more 
expensive than regular asphalt but creates a 
Loss of Public Control: Camino Colombia Toll Road
The Camino Colombia Toll Road is a prime example of problems with lack of public control associated with privatization. The Camino Colombia Toll Road, 
located in Texas, first opened to traffic in 2000. Completely financed by private 
investors at a cost of $90 million, this road was intended to support the increased 
traffic associated with the North American Free Trade Agreement.56 Politicians 
predicted the road would be a “generator of regional economic activity” and provide 
congestion relief. However, the road fell far short of its projections. An indepen-
dent auditor predicted that the Camino Colombia road would generate $9 million 
in revenue within the first year, but instead it only received $500,000.57 By 2004, 
the toll road had failed and bondholders foreclosed on the remaining $75 million 
note. The road was sold at an auction for $12.1 million to John Hancock Financial 
Services Inc. TxDOT had initially bid $11.1 million for the road, but was unwill-
ing to increase its offer. After purchasing the roadway, John Hancock Financial 
Services, Inc. immediately closed the road to all traffic. This move forced TxDOT 
to pay the private company $20 million to purchase the road, allowing it to finally 
reopen the route after five months.58
This clearly shows one of the pitfalls of privatization. Texas lost complete control 
of transportation along the toll road, while a private entity had the right to close the 
route regardless of the public consequences. Unfortunately, many transportation 
officials do not appear to have learned from this experience, and future privatiza-
tion agreements may have similar results.
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number of public benefits. It reduces strain 
on sewers and other water infrastructure 
because the surface is porous enough to 
allow water to return back into the ground. 
It also creates an outlet for used tires that 
are otherwise difficult and costly to dispose 
of. Despite the potential public benefits, a 
private operator would most likely be dis-
suaded from upgrading to this standard by 
the extra costs.59
Even if high maintenance standards 
are specified in a contract, without proper 
oversight private companies will have 
a monetary incentive to under-invest. 
Private operators may seek investments 
that help attract drivers, but these are not 
necessarily the kind of safety, environ-
mental, and other investments that public 
policy requires. Unfortunately, states have 
exhibited an inability to properly oversee 
private contractors in the past. The Fed-
eral Highway Administration, in a review 
of quality assurance activities, found 
numerous deficiencies “such as a lack of 
independent sampling of highway materials 
for verification tests; inadequate statisti-
cal comparisons of the test results; and 
insufficient state control of test samples, 
sampling locations, and testing data.” They 
also found that pavement on highways is 
deteriorating faster than expected, which 
they attribute in part to the weaknesses in 
oversight.60
Private operators will have a greater in-
centive not to invest in improvements and 
maintenance as they come under financial 
distress or approach the end of a contract. 
Private operators should be required to 
provide prior safeguards against this pos-
sibility. For instance, for I-495 in Virginia 
the operator is required to provide a letter 
of credit or performance bond that the 
DOT can use if the roadway is not returned 
in proper condition. Public agencies can 
also retain a portion of tolls during the final 
years of a contract and dispense them only 
if facilities are returned in good condition. 
These kinds of measures can – and should 
– be included with any contract; but they 
represent yet another area that govern-
ment lawyers and accountants will need 
to monitor.
The Public Will Not 
Receive Full Value
Putting a fair dollar value on a long-term 
toll road lease is difficult. As events of 
the last year have shown, the state of the 
broader economy and financial markets can 
change quickly and dramatically, leaving 
business plans and state budgets in ruins. 
The current crisis in state budgets makes 
large up-front payments for toll roads dif-
ficult to resist. To give a sense of scale, the 
$1.8 billion sum paid for the 99-year lease 
on Chicago’s Skyway is enough to pay 
every resident in Chicago a one-time sum 
of $643.61 The consortium that purchased 
a 75-year lease to operate the Indiana Toll 
Road paid an even greater sum: $3.8 billion. 
Potential privatization deals for the New 
Jersey and Pennsylvania turnpikes men-
tioned payments between $10 billion and 
$30 billion. For elected officials struggling 
to plug chronic budget shortfalls, these 
short-term windfalls are enticing.
As impressive as the upfront payments 
are, they pale in comparison to the likely 
value of the future tolls traded for them. 
The sums are smaller than public entities 
could generate doing the same financing 
themselves. 
Financial analysis by experts in as-
set valuation confirms that privatization 
deals have failed to supply full value for 
the future tolls that private companies are 
expected to collect.
• Analysis of the Indiana and Chicago 
deals by Dennis Enright of NW 
Financial, a New Jersey investment 
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bank, found that the private inves-
tors in those deals would likely recoup 
their investment in less than 20 years. 
That analysis is confirmed in at least 
Indiana’s case by the company that 
won the bid. The company, Mac-
quarie, sent investors a presentation 
asserting an “anticipated 15 year pay-
back to equity.”62 Given that Indiana’s 
deal is 75 years long, and Chicago’s 
is 99 years, the analysis demonstrates 
that governments in these states 
received far less for their assets than 
they are worth.
• Economist and long-term valuation 
expert Roger Skurski at the University 
of Notre Dame found that the $3.85 
billion Indiana Toll Road lease should 
have more reasonably been valued at 
$11.38 billion.63
• A study by finance experts at Penn 
State and Harvard calculated that 
based on the same schedule of tolls on 
the Pennsylvania Turnpike, the public 
could generate $26.5 billion over 50 
years compared with $14.8 billion 
for a 50-year private asset lease.64 
That same year, after deterioration 
of private capital markets, a private 
consortium subsequently offered $12.8 
billion for a 75-year lease.
• In Texas, the Department of Trans-
portation (TxDOT) initially excluded 
a public toll authority from bidding to 
build and run a new toll road planned 
near Dallas, even though it connected 
to another one of the authority’s 
roads. Instead, TxDOT accepted 
a $3.1 billion bid from the private 
company, Cintra. The bid, though 
seemingly large, would have gener-
ated an estimated 12.5 percent rate 
of profit for Cintra and would have 
required the public to compensate the 
company if a competing roadway was 
built within 20 miles. Due to outrage 
over the deal, one state senator initi-
ated hearings, which led to a tempo-
rary moratorium on private deals and 
provided the opportunity for the toll 
authority to bid. The public authori-
ty’s bid offered an estimated $1.9 bil-
lion in additional proceeds, calculated 
on a net present value basis, despite 
the public entity’s higher estimated 
investment for constructing the road 
itself.65 The state was able to cancel its 
initial contract with the private  
operator.
• A 2008 report prepared for the Vir-
ginia Attorney General’s office said 
of the experience with the Dulles 
Greenway, an early “green field” proj-
ect, “it has been well known for some 
eighteen years that a private toll road 
would be significantly more expensive 
than a publicly funded project.”66
• In 1999, Ontario, Canada, received 
$3.1 billion for the lease of toll road 
407 ETR. In the following years, 
commercial and residential devel-
opment exceeded government pro-
jections, and the value of the road 
increased. In 2002, a valuation con-
ducted by an investor in the conces-
sion estimated that the road was 
actually worth $6.2 billion Cana-
dian.67
Figuring out the fair price for a toll road 
is a high-stakes guessing game. The long-
term value of the upfront payment itself 
depends on predicting correctly the extent 
to which inflation will erode the value of 
those dollars and the rate of return inves-
tors could have otherwise garnered with 
the money. Expected revenues depend on 
future toll rates and how many cars and 
trucks will use the road, as well as what-
ever lesser revenue may be obtained from 
service area vendors and development of 
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future advertising and amenities. Private 
concession deals attempt to reduce uncer-
tainty by indexing future toll rates to fac-
tors such as inflation and the growth of the 
national economy, but much uncertainty 
remains on the revenue side. Meanwhile, 
the road operator’s costs will depend on 
factors such as future maintenance and 
improvements, the number of workers that 
will be employed, and the cost of providing 
road safety and snow removal. All of these 
factors will themselves be influenced by 
future trends in transportation technol-
ogy and demographics as well as the de-
gree to which the road operator can shift 
costs onto the state. Furthermore, some 
private investors may gain substantially 
by refinancing their projects after a deal is 
completed. Sometimes allocation of these 
refinancing gains is included in the agree-
ment; however, quite often they are not 
considered.68
To be fair, it is not only state govern-
ments that have a difficult time estimating 
the value of toll roads. Private investors 
– fueled by the speculative fervor of the 
last decade – have also made big missteps. 
In late 2008, as a result of lower than pro-
jected traffic and the repercussions of the 
financial crisis, Macquarie Infrastructure 
Group was forced to write down the value 
of several of its toll road properties in the 
United States. The company wrote down 
the value of the Dulles Greenway by 13 
percent, the Indiana Toll Road by 45 per-
cent, the Chicago Skyway by 21 percent, 
and California’s South Bay Expressway 
by 91 percent.69 Published reports have 
suggested that Macquarie may even be at 
risk of defaulting on debt payments for 
the Indiana Toll Road and the South Bay 
Expressway due to lower-than-expected 
revenues from the highways.70
Concession agreements must include 
clear provisions to deal with the potential 
for default – including provisions that 
guarantee ongoing maintenance of the 
highway and the quick and orderly rever-
sion of the highway back to state control. 
(See page 27.)
But while both government and private 
actors can fail to put an accurate value on 
toll roads, the public is likelier to end up 
getting the short end of the deal.
Private Investors Have Higher  
Costs of Capital
Private companies have higher long-term 
borrowing costs than public entities. Ac-
cording to analysis by Dennis Enright 
at the investment bank, NW Financial 
Group, in 2007 public sector costs for 
raising capital through debt were a full 35 
percent less than the lowest cost a private 
entity could hope to obtain.72 Other aca-
demic studies confirm these higher private 
capital costs.73
The Indiana Mis-Investment
Governor Mitch Daniels of Indiana promoted the concession of the Indiana Toll Road as a way to receive money upfront and invest it for future use. He argued 
that the interest from such a large investment could be used to fund future trans-
portation programs, as well as other initiatives. Unfortunately, however, after only 
two years, revenue from the initial investment is already $138.6 million less than 
projected, leaving Indiana in a precarious position.71
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Today, due to the tighter private credit 
market, the disparity in financing costs 
is wider than it was. A recent report by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers found that in 
countries with good credit ratings, the 
spread between the cost of public and 
private capital – once in the range of 0.6 
to 0.8 percentage points – had increased 
to 1 to 1.5 percentage points by late 2008. 
“Funding for large brownfield monetiza-
tions (like the Pennsylvania Turnpike at 
$12 billion+) are finding credit margins 
are well above 200 basis points [2 percent-
age points],” the report states.74 Deloitte, 
a major consultant on privatization proj-
ects, advises that, “with the maturing of 
the private finance market in the United 
Kingdom, the financing costs difference 
between the private cost of capital and 
public borrowing is now in the range of 
only 1-3 percentage points.”75 The public-
private spread is nothing new. For example, 
back in 1997, Karen Hedlund of the law 
firm Nossaman, Gunther, Knox & Elliott 
similarly reported in Toll Roads News that 
the public sector enjoyed a 200 basis point 
advantage over investors when borrowing 
long-term in the capital markets.76
Due to these higher costs, Robert Poole, 
director of transportation studies at the 
Reason Foundation and a strong proponent 
of road privatization, predicts that states 
will receive lower bids for their roadways as 
investors attempt to cover their costs.77
The financial crisis has already doomed 
at least one privatization project. In 2008, 
Missouri officials announced an ambitious 
plan to repair or replace 802 bridges by 
2014. The initial proposal envisioned using 
private financing to pay for construction, 
with the state reimbursing the investors 
over a fixed period of time. However, 
when the credit market began to worsen in 
September 2008, private financing became 
infeasible. The Missouri DOT quickly 
scrapped the private-financing scheme 
and now intends to fund the entire project 
through the sale of government bonds. In 
explaining the decision to forego private 
funds, Bob Brendel, the transportation 
department outreach coordinator, noted 
that it had become clear that the public 
sector could borrow money more easily 
than private citizens.78
Because government officials can issue 
tax-free bonds and bond traders are will-
ing to accept lower interest rates on public 
bonds, deals based on private capital are 
inherently more expensive than public 
financing. In light of the turmoil in the 
credit market, it will probably become even 
more difficult for the state to get a bargain 
through private financing. Moreover, ap-
proximately 20 percent of the financing 
for a private deal is typically done through 
issuance of stocks or other private equity. 
As even aggressive privatization advocates 
concede, equity is typically more expen-
sive than debt.79 When investors purchase 
private infrastructure stocks, they take on 
greater risk than if they purchase private 
infrastructure bonds; therefore, they ex-
pect higher rates of return. Thus, regard-
less of whether private companies raise 
capital through debt or equity, their costs 
will be higher than public financing.
The higher private cost of capital 
means that privatization deals will create 
significantly higher costs that get passed 
onto taxpayers and drivers. Even when 
multiple private companies bid for a public 
toll road, their higher long-term borrow-
ing costs will be passed on to the public in 
the form of lower upfront payments than 
the government could generate by bor-
rowing against the same future toll hikes 
without using a private road operator as an 
intermediary. In other words, privatiza-
tion requires greater toll hikes to generate 
the same up-front payment that could be 
generated without privatization. Accord-
ing to the NW Financial Group study, 
published before the recent financial crisis, 
“doing such a deal with non-public own-
ership will result in tolls 20 to 30 percent 
higher than a public deal of equal size.”80 
The Pitfalls of Toll Road Privatization 25
The previously mentioned study of public 
and private options for the Pennsylvania 
Turnpike similarly found that, “[f ]or a 
given upfront sum to be raised, tolls levied 
in a Full Public Monetization may require 
only 71.5% of the tolls charged under a 
Corporate Lease.”81
There is no debate about whether public 
borrowing costs are lower than the private 
sector’s. Defenders of road privatization 
may argue that private-sector efficiencies 
will offset the private sector’s higher bor-
rowing costs, but there is little evidence 
that those efficiencies, where they exist, can 
make up for the higher cost of capital.
Potential for Minor Cost Savings 
on Existing Toll Roads Does Not 
Offset the Higher Cost of Capital
Privatization advocates often counter 
concerns about the high capital costs of 
privatization by talking about potential 
efficiency increases from private opera-
tors. Relatively minor cost savings may be 
gained by avoiding public-sector rules 
about hiring standards.83 Overall, how-
ever, the potential savings are so limited 
that Macquarie Infrastructure Group, for 
example, reported to potential investors on 
the Indiana deal, “no significant cost sav-
ings envisaged.”84 The U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) reported 
that the minor cost savings are often out-
weighed by increased monitoring costs.85 
In sum, private operation cannot be ex-
pected to produce sufficient cost savings to 
offset the high costs of privatization.
Private Deals Must Also Cover 
Shareholder Profits
While the high capital costs of privatization 
alone ensure the public cannot get as much 
value from a private deal as it could from 
a public one, public value is also reduced 
Privatization requires greater toll hikes to generate the same  
up-front payment that could be generated without privatization.
Securitization without Privatization
Public entities are able to securitize or “monetize” future toll road revenues without going through the process of privatization. In testimony before the New Jersey 
Assembly’s Transportation Committee, securitization expert Peter Humphreys ex-
plained that, without privatization, the state could generate a large up-front payment 
even without aggressive toll hikes. By securitizing future toll revenue, he calculated, 
the state could generate an upfront payment of $1.2 billion for each annual $100 
million of future toll revenue it securitized for 15 years. Given that New Jersey tolls 
currently generate $700 million a year, a single deal without a single toll hike would 
then generate $8.4 billion over 15 years.82
Securitization is not always a wise option for state governments because it too 
is a form of borrowing from future toll payers, but states that pursue this option 
will at least generally get a better deal than if that same borrowing is done through 
privatization.
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by the high profits the investors make. For 
instance, Cintra, one of the companies 
purchasing the Chicago Skyway, revealed 
that it anticipates bringing in a 12.5 percent 
return on equity.87 Analysis by Infrastruc-
ture Management Group similarly found 
that investors in recent concession deals 
expected a long-term return rate of around 
12 percent on existing toll roads and 14 
percent or higher for projects involving 
new construction.88
Whatever the profit share allocated to 
shareholders, this is a net loss to the public. 
Drivers on private toll roads must not only 
cover the costs of road construction and 
maintenance; they must also pay for the 
extra compensation of shareholders and 
executives. Due to the large profit margins, 
operators of private roads are required 
to raise much more revenue than public 
agencies. This extra revenue is achieved 
through higher tolls than would have been 
charged without privatization. 
Transaction Costs
Privatization deals also create significant 
legal and monitoring costs for state or 
local governments. For governments to 
avoid unintended consequences, they must 
Highway Modernization can be Accomplished without 
Privatization
The decision to establish a private toll road should be distinguished from other highway modernization efforts that may be part of a private road proposal. Mod-
ernization can be accomplished under either public or private auspices. A particular 
public toll authority may, for instance, be slow to adopt electronic tolling, while a 
potential private operator may promise to install the new technology promptly. In 
this case, elected officials have the power to instruct the toll authority to modern-
ize, even if they have to pass new legislation or appoint new toll authority managers 
to speed the process. Alternately, the public could hire the private operator just 
to install the new system. The same is true of proposals for toll lanes that create 
discounts for carpoolers or for driving during non-peak hours. These approaches 
can be done with or without a private intermediary. The key distinction is that a 
privatized modernization program does not include a transfer of control over the 
roadway, with the associated long-term loss of public value.
Modernization should similarly be distinguished from privatization in situations 
where the state seeks to build a new toll road or expand an existing one. There are 
potential gains and risks to outsourcing construction project design and oversight 
to a private firm. In some cases a private builder in a “design-build” project might 
better manage the risk of cost overruns. But, as problems with Boston’s Central Ar-
tery “Big Dig” project managed by Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff illustrate, private 
outsourcing can lead to its own problems with cost, safety, and quality.86
The point is that highway modernization projects should be distinguished from 
financing and long-term ownership. Giving greater discretion and incentives to a 
private builder or creating high-tech tolling options need not entail private owner-
ship or private financing of the completed road.
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hire lawyers and analysts to conduct asset 
valuation, performance monitoring, and 
contract enforcement. Goldman Sachs, 
for example, was paid $20 million for 
financial advice on the Indiana privatiza-
tion deal and $9 million for the Chicago 
Skyway deal.89 Many of these costs would 
also be incurred if the government were 
to use a public entity such as the turnpike 
authority to securitize future toll revenues 
for an upfront payment. Under a private 
deal, however, additional state inspectors, 
financial experts and lawyers would be 
needed throughout the contract term to 
interpret the contract and potentially liti-
gate to ensure that the private operator is 
upholding the terms of the deal. The state 
of Virginia, for instance, has 30 engineers, 
lawyers, and accountants dedicated to over-
seeing its private road deals; and the state 
must still make use of additional outside 
consultants.90
Private Companies 
Often Engage in Risky 
Financial Schemes
Toll road deals are based on upfront 
payments to the states or construction 
companies and a contract for the long 
term maintenance and upgrading of the 
highway. This relationship assumes the 
private operator will have the available 
funds to meet these obligations. But what 
happens if it does not and cannot keep its 
part of the bargain? This is not a merely 
theoretical question.
If these business models prove unsus-
tainable, the public may be left with a road 
operator in bankruptcy who will not invest 
in maintenance and upkeep, or who will 
collapse at an untimely moment, leaving 
government to figure out how to continue 
to operate the highway amidst a cloud of 
litigation. Private toll operators in both 
Texas and Virginia have already faced 
bankruptcy, leading to the foreclosure of 
Texas’ private road and subsequent auction. 
Unfortunately, the purchaser of the road 
in Texas immediately closed the road to 
traffic, forcing the state to purchase it at 
an inflated price one year later.
Like the mortgage industry, the pri-
vate infrastructure industry often relies 
on heavily leveraged debt and the trading 
of long-term risk. Some infrastructure 
investors such as Australia’s Macquarie 
have followed the mortgage broker model 
by repackaging infrastructure deals into 
shares of listed infrastructure funds. Fi-
nancial firms such as AIG and Goldman 
Sachs have followed suit.
Public watchdogs are increasingly wary 
of this trend. As James L. Oberstar and 
Peter DeFazio, the chairmen of the U.S. 
House Transportation and Infrastruc-
ture Committee and the Subcommittee 
on Highways and Transit, respectively, 
warned, “The dependence of these firms 
on debt and asset inflation rather than in-
come or cash flows to finance acquisitions 
and pay dividends to shareholders raises 
questions concerning the sustainability of 
this model.”91
Typically, firms that have invested in 
toll roads acquired their investments with 
large amounts of borrowing. The peak of 
these acquisitions occurred several years 
ago when credit was cheap. A few firms 
even used credit to pay dividends to their 
stockholders. Some of the biggest deals 
are financed with interest rates that start 
low and balloon upwards over time, like 
those infamous mortgages with low teaser 
rates. Jim Chanos, an early critic of Enron, 
warned in Fortune magazine about the 
strategies used by the largest infrastruc-
ture firm, Macquarie, “Borrowing future 
growth to pay investors today bears the 
hallmarks of a Ponzi scheme.”92
Regardless of whether such dire warnings 
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Figure 2, a-b. Stock Prices for Private Infrastructure Companies 
(in Australian dollars)94
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are overstated, more expensive credit has 
certainly hurt private toll operators’ bottom 
lines. Most heavily hit on the private side 
are the Australian infrastructure financing 
groups, Babcock & Brown and Macquarie. 
These firms are leaders of Australia’s well-
developed infrastructure finance market. 
Stock prices for the two Australian firms 
fell dramatically in the past months as 
investors began to worry that these firms 
had far less liquidity than they suggested, 
shown by the graphs on the previous page. 
The price of stock in the Babcock & Brown 
Infrastructure Fund had dropped to just 7 
cents per share (Australian) by February 
2009.93 Many infrastructure funds have 
been downgraded by rating agencies and 
analysts have posted warnings regarding 
these liquidity concerns.
Problems  
Compounded By  
Excessively Long  
Contracts
The loss of control and lost value from 
privatization are greatly compounded by 
the fact that privatization contracts often 
extend so far into the future. The Chicago 
and Indiana lease deals will stretch for gen-
erations: 99 years and 75 years, respectively. 
Private investors prefer deals at least 50 
years long, because that length allows them 
to qualify for large tax subsidies. 
To appreciate how profound future 
changes will be over these time frames, 
consider these transportation-related mile-
stones: Henry Ford introduced the Model 
T in 1908, 101 years ago and Congress cre-
ated the interstate highway system in 1956, 
53 years ago. Similarly, population changes 
during these time periods can be dramatic. 
Metropolitan areas have doubled their 
populations in the course of a few decades, 
creating huge changes in transportation 
needs. Massive, unforeseeable changes will 
likely take place for transportation tech-
nology, networks, demographics, and the 
distribution of population over time frames 
like those in the Chicago and Indiana deals. 
In the face of such uncertainties, govern-
ments cannot predict their transportation 
needs, nor the revenue potential of their 
toll roads, well enough to negotiate a deal 
that fairly allocates risks, dictates policy, 
or sets a fair price.
No contract can be crafted well enough 
to solve these problems. Even the most 
public-minded elected officials with the 
best lawyers and consultants cannot draw 
up a lease or concession contract that will 
predict the public’s needs and contingen-
cies in the distant future. Ambiguities 
in the future interpretation of a contract 
under unforeseen circumstances may have 
huge stakes and may need to be litigated. 
Professor José Gómez-Ibáñez at Har-
vard, who has written numerous books on 
infrastructure privatization, describes this 
problem as  “the overuse of long-term con-
cession contracts as the method of regula-
tion.” He explains that, “the concession 
contract attempts to describe completely 
the obligations of the private firm to the 
government and vice versa, and it can not be 
changed unilaterally by either party. …The 
main risk with concession contracts is that 
an unforeseen event will make the contract 
unworkable for one or both parties. In such 
cases, the parties face a difficult choice of 
whether to renegotiate the contract or try 
to live with its unsatisfactory terms until 
the concession expires.”95
A study for the Organizat ion for 
Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) and the European Commission of 
Ministries of Transport similarly concluded 
that toll road contracts beyond 30 and 35 
years are “sub-optimal for taxpayers” and 
refers to the long-term losses of longer 
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deals as “mortgaging the future.”96 A 
Federal Highway Administration study of 
European experiences recommends against 
deals longer than 30-35 years. England and 
France, according to this study, will require 
private road contracts to be renegotiated at 
the end of each 7.5 years.97
Beyond the uncertainties inherent in 
a multi-generational time frame, an ad-
ditional issue of good government arises: 
disenfranchisement of future generations 
of voters. Private investors in toll roads 
specifically seek out essential thorough-
fares that lack attractive alternative routes. 
These highways are vital infrastructure, 
integral to the daily lives of residents. So 
long as the state, directly or through a 
turnpike authority, retains control over its 
toll roads, voters have the ability to hold 
decision-makers accountable. Turning over 
control of the roads to private investors 
eliminates that accountability and binds 
future voters to present-day decisions. 
Doing so for several generations of voters 
is simply anti-democratic.
Lack of Transparency
Given the profound implications of road 
privatization, no deal should be approved 
if the public has not had the opportunity 
to review, question and comment upon it. 
Unfortunately though, many states lack 
legislation requiring transparency in pri-
vate road projects, such as making propos-
als available to affected communities. This 
refusal to provide information is justified 
on the basis that private road builders and 
operators regard their own analysis and 
proposals as “proprietary” business secrets. 
But such rules prevent full public review of 
the process and undermine both transpar-
ency and the opportunity for full public 
participation.98 The Indiana and Chicago 
leasing deals were finalized with very little 
public deliberation or oversight. Texas 
would have lost billions of dollars in rev-
enue if public hearings had not exposed the 
higher payoff that could be offered by the 
public authority. The Florida Department 
Cars lining up for the opening of the Pennsylvania Turnpike in 1940 (Photo: Pennsylvania 
Turnpike Commission).
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of Transportation is actually exempt from 
undergoing review of its privatization con-
tracts by the Florida Council on Efficient 
Governments, a council created to review 
state contracts with private operators. Full 
transparency requires the public to have 
a meaningful opportunity to participate 
in public hearings plus timely disclosure 
of a potential deal’s terms and any related 
contracts and subcontracts well before a 
decision is made.
Likewise, citizens need to be able to hold 
their representatives accountable for their 
decision to approve (or not approve) any 
privatization deal. Opinion polls show the 
public generally opposing road privatiza-
tion. (See “Strong Public Opposition to 
Road Privatization.”)  In order to avoid a 
situation in which the executive branch ap-
proves a deal that legislators subsequently 
disavow, the legislature should also be 
required to vote on the final terms of any 
potential deal. This is akin to the way that 
Congress is required to ratify trade deals 
negotiated by the federal executive branch. 
Legislators who must defend their votes 
will listen more closely to the public. If gov-
ernors need legislators’ approval, they will 
also be more attentive to public opinion.
Inadequate Oversight 
Exists to Ensure  
the Public Interest  
is Protected
State Level
States do not Rigorously Evaluate 
Privatization Agreements
In order to safeguard the public interest, 
elected officials must rigorously examine 
every aspect of a privatization agreement. 
They must ensure that privatization is the 
Strong Public Opposition to Road Privatization
Across the country, there is strong opposition to road privatization. A poll conducted by the National Association of Realtors found that 84 percent of 
Americans oppose the privatization of existing public highways. Two-thirds oppose 
letting private companies build, own and operate new roadways.99 Similarly, a 2009 
survey by HNTB found that 92 percent of Americans said they most trusted either 
state, federal or local government to best manage and maintain infrastructure 
projects, compared to 7 percent who chose private sector companies.100 
Surveys from states that have approved or proposed road privatization mirror 
these results. The data follow a trend, identified by Rod Diridon, Sr., executive 
director of the San Jose State University’s Mineta Transportation Institute, that 
people tend to become more skeptical about privatization the more they learn 
about a particular plan.101 For example, in Pennsylvania, 49 percent of those polled 
in March 2007 said they supported plans to privatize the Pennsylvania Turnpike. 
However, by August 2008, the level of support had dropped to 29 percent, with 60 
percent of Pennsylvanians opposing Turnpike privatization.102
DRIVE AT 
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most appropriate means to deliver a par-
ticular project, and they must be certain 
that aspects of the public interest, such 
as protecting taxpayers and the environ-
ment, are not overlooked. Unfortunately, 
state governments have failed to develop 
systematic approaches to evaluating these 
public interest concerns in privatization 
agreements. Instead, public officials tend to 
employ an ad hoc approach in which they 
may consider some aspects of the public 
interest, such as the impact on regional mo-
bility, but ignore other important aspects, 
such as equity concerns.103
Governments in other countries, such 
as Australia and the United Kingdom, 
have developed systematic approaches 
to identifying and evaluating the public 
interest before entering into privatization 
agreements. Typically, these governments 
identify important elements of the public 
interest and develop criteria for how to 
consider potential deals. In Australia, for 
example, the state of Victoria requires 
all privatization agreements to be judged 
according to eight specific public interest 
tests, including whether the rights and 
views of affected communities have been 
heard and protected, whether community 
health and safety are ensured, and whether 
there are sufficient safeguards to ensure 
public access to the infrastructure.104 These 
public interest evaluations are conducted 
often during the negotiations to adequately 
protect the public.105
Unfortunately, these kinds of safeguards 
have been used much less frequently in the 
United States. In a recent report titled, 
Highway Public-Private Partnerships: More 
Rigorous Up-front Analysis Could Better Se-
cure Potential Benefits and Protect the Public 
Interest, the U.S. Government Account-
ability Office notes that neither Chicago 
nor Indiana employed public interest tests 
prior to the leasing of the Chicago Skyway 
or the Indiana Toll Road, such as ensuring 
transparency of negotiations and examin-
ing effects on regional mobility. They also 
failed to use comparisons with the public 
sector to examine the long-term costs of 
a project and the value of transferring 
risk to the private sector. In fact, Indiana 
Governor Mitch Daniels did not even com-
mission an independent financial analysis 
of the concession until the deal was almost 
complete.106 Similarly, transportation of-
ficials in other states, such as New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, and Illinois, admit that they 
have not developed a systematic approach 
to assessing public interest concerns.107
The failure to use formal public interest 
tests may result in certain aspects of the 
public interest being overlooked, such as 
the value of foregone toll revenue. When 
states have decided mid-course to conduct 
thorough analysis, it has often changed 
their decisions. In Texas, for example, 
Harris County conducted a study in 2006 
to examine the value of a long-term conces-
sion compared to retaining public control. 
The county determined that it would gain 
little through the concession, and that by 
implementing more aggressive tolling, it 
could realize similar or greater financial 
gains. Thus, Harris County opted to retain 
control of the toll roads.108 Similarly, when 
Oregon hired a consultant to compare the 
estimated costs of private versus public 
sector financing, the state concluded that 
the cost of the privately financed project 
was not justified given the limited value 
of risk transfer. Unfortunately, the study 
was not conducted until after the private 
partners had already done substantial early 
development work.109
States Lack the Capacity to  
Independently Assess and  
Monitor Concession Agreements
Private road contracts require ongoing 
vigilance. Private operators have a mon-
etary incentive to underinvest if such un-
derinvestment will not affect their bottom 
line. For this reason, public oversight of 
transportation projects is essential to en-
sure that safety standards are maintained. 
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But, while the budgets for transportation 
departments have increased over the past 
five years, staffing levels have either de-
clined or remained stagnant.110 This has 
resulted in an unprecedented level of con-
tracting out by state agencies, accompanied 
by a decline in oversight.
Long-term concession deals are ex-
tremely complex, and state DOTs are 
unlikely to have the in-house expertise 
needed to appraise, monitor, or oversee 
privatization agreements. The state must 
also be ready to litigate when companies 
demand compensation for public deci-
sions that reduce toll traffic. In Georgia, 
the DOT’s new commissioner put a hold 
on all privatization agreements due to 
her staff’s lack of experience.111 In order 
to manage these projects, state DOTs 
are increasingly outsourcing engineer-
ing, inspections and other tasks to private 
contractors and consultants. In 2006, the 
Federal Highway Administration found 
that several state projects had been delayed 
due to inadequate staff oversight capacity 
and expertise. Reviews of quality assurance 
activities have found numerous deficiencies 
in state oversight of consultants.112 Simi-
larly, the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) finds that the trend toward 
outsourcing erodes in-house expertise, 
which will further diminish the ability to 
oversee projects in the future.113
Increasing reliance on outside con-
tractors has also increased the potential 
for conflicts of interest with private road 
operators. With the growing interest in 
privatization among investment banking 
firms, there is a possibility that a firm may 
provide financial advice to a state while 
simultaneously engaging in investment 
banking for the same deal.114 For example, 
Goldman Sachs was an advisor to Indiana 
on the concession of its toll road, but failed 
to mention that it was also creating a fund 
whose sole purpose was to invest in infra-
structure. In fact, while it was supposedly 
advising Indiana on how to get the best 
return, its Australian subsidiary’s mutual 
funds were investing in Macquarie Infra-
structure Group (the concessionaire), be-
coming de facto investors in the deal. These 
potential conflicts of interest, coupled with 
the lack of oversight by state officials, mean 
that decisions may not be guided by what 
is best for the public.115 
Federal Level
While the federal government in recent 
years has aggressively promoted road priva-
tization through new regulations, it has 
done little to develop or disseminate public 
interest protections for such deals. This has 
particularly profound consequences when 
private funding replaces federal grants 
that would have required public interest 
safeguards and reviews. 
The Bush administration Department 
of Transportation actively promoted 
privatization agreements through various 
policies and practices, including programs 
that waive federal regulations and grant 
tax subsidies for privatization projects. For 
example, the federal government waived 
regulations for projects in Texas and Or-
egon that prevent private investors from 
being involved in a highway project until 
federally mandated environmental review 
has been completed. The U.S. Department 
of Transportation and the Federal High-
way Administration have also promoted 
privatization agreements to state officials 
through activities such as drafting model 
legislation and creating a promotional 
website and newsletter.116
Despite these efforts at promotion, the 
administration and U.S. DOT did not 
seek to regulate privatization agreements, 
even when national interests were affected. 
When federal funds are used in highway 
construction, the projects are constrained 
by numerous federal regulations. These 
regulations relate to issues such as prevailing 
wages (Davis-Bacon), assistance for small 
and minority-owned businesses (disadvan-
taged business enterprises), environmental 
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review (National Environmental Policy 
Act), air quality improvement (clean air 
conformity), environmental mitigation 
(wetlands), resource conservation (Endan-
gered Species Act), domestic job and indus-
trial base protection (Buy America), and 
accommodation for the disabled (Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act).117 Regulations 
similarly require that transportation plans 
be developed in a transparent manner and 
reflect the collective views of the com-
munity.118 However, when federal funds 
are not used, no federal guidelines exist 
to regulate the projects. States can even 
avoid public protections by separating out 
the specific portions of a project that would 
not pass federal muster and funding these 
parts with private financing.119
Even when federal funds have been 
used for private projects, the federal gov-
ernment has avoided active involvement. 
As the GAO notes, the Federal Highway 
Administration has yet to develop federal 
definitions of the “public interest,” and of-
ficials have failed to provide guidance on 
identifying and evaluating public interest 
considerations.120 This creates the potential 
for national interests, such as interstate 
commerce issues, to be neglected. For ex-
ample, federal officials did not review the 
terms of the concession agreement for the 
Indiana Toll Road, even though 60 percent 
of the traffic on the highway is interstate 
in nature.121 Such review was not required, 
according to federal officials, because the 
federal funds used for the road had been 
repaid.122 Similarly, because the lease of 
the Chicago Skyway did not include any 
new expenditure of federal funds, there was 
no requirement that the Federal Highway 
Administration approve the lease. The law 
did require the FHWA to ensure that the 
toll rates under the agreement represented 
a reasonable rate of return. However, 
because federal officials had no standard 
definition of a “reasonable rate of return,” 
they deferred to the state’s discretion.123
Furthermore, though the federal gov-
ernment has the authority to oversee any 
project receiving federal aid, it does so 
only rarely. Following the passage of the 
Intermodal Surface Transportation Equity 
Act in 1991, the federal government has 
increasingly delegated oversight responsi-
bility to state departments of transporta-
tion.124 Unfortunately, many states lack the 
ability to properly oversee projects.
Ultimately, a lack of federal involvement 
in important transportation projects can be 
detrimental for interstate transportation. 
States may agree, for example, to long-term 
concessions that include non-compete or 
concession clauses, which may hamper 
the nation’s ability to respond properly to 
new transportation needs. Additionally, 
many of the transportation projects being 
considered include facilities in more than 
one state, or projects that are located in one 
area but benefit larger regions. If states act 
in complete independence of each other, 
without federal oversight, they are likely 
to produce an uncoordinated and inef-
ficient transportation system.125 Thus it 
is essential for the federal government to 
take a more active role in regulating and 
overseeing privatization agreements.
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Developing a General 
Approach to Toll 
Road Privatization
Earlier in this report, we suggested a series of criteria that could be applied to privatization proposals to deter-
mine whether they have the potential to 
deliver benefits for the public. To recap, 
privatization may make sense when:
• Private companies have a proven 
comparative advantage over gov-
ernment agencies in providing a 
particular good or service. 
• The services that are privatized are 
well defined, with clear criteria for 
the evaluation of success or failure. 
• Private contractors’ performance 
is disciplined by ongoing competi-
tion, with multiple contractors ca-
pable of submitting bids and contracts 
of short enough duration to allow  
for unsatisfactory performers to be 
readily replaced.
• Government officials making the 
decision to privatize can be held  
accountable for the results of a deal.
When evaluating toll road privatization 
according to these criteria, it is necessary 
to look separately at the two types of priva-
tization arrangements discussed in this 
report: the leasing of existing roads and the 
private construction of new roads. 
Privatization of Existing Roadways: 
A Bad Deal for the Public
The privatization of existing toll roads 
fails to meet all of these conditions. Pub-
lic entities, not private companies, have 
a clear and significant advantage when it 
comes to the long-term cost of capital: 
the ability to issue tax-free debt. Second, 
while the operation of a toll road may be a 
well-defined task, the provision of overall 
mobility to the public is not. Non-compete 
clauses and other provisions in concession 
agreements – often considered necessary to 
attract private investment – can undermine 
the ability to provide a robust and efficient 
transportation network. Third, toll road 
privatization creates a monopoly with no 
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meaningful ongoing competition and deals 
last for several decades. Finally, the length 
of these deals insulates them from public 
accountability. The downsides of a deal are 
likely to surface only after officials have 
left office and the public has no recourse 
to change the contract.
As a result, in order to protect the 
public interest, states should not agree to 
the privatization of existing roadways. 
The evidence shows that concession 
agreements for existing toll roads provide 
short-term benefits in the form of lump-
sum payments. However, the basic eco-
nomics of toll deals indicate that the value 
of those upfront payments will be less than 
the value of future tolls that drivers will be 
forced to pay, given the profit margins and 
higher capital costs of private operators. 
New Private Toll Roads:  
Proceed With Great Caution
Private finance for the construction of 
new roads could only make sense for 
certain projects if public interest pro-
tections are greatly enhanced. Before 
considering any privatization agreement, 
federal and state governments should de-
velop systematic approaches to ensure the 
public interest is protected. 
First, any new roads or new lanes must 
be consistent with long-term transporta-
tion plans, as well as with broader gov-
ernmental commitments to reduce oil 
consumption, protect air quality, or curb 
global warming pollution. Public officials 
should not prioritize projects based on the 
availability of private capital. Instead, they 
should focus on projects that meet true 
public needs, regardless of whether private 
investors see those projects as potential 
profit opportunities. 
Second, state governments need to 
honestly evaluate their capacity to assess 
and monitor concession agreements to 
determine whether they can adequately 
protect their constituents. Many state 
transportation departments lack the 
expertise necessary to evaluate privatiza-
tion agreements properly, and history has 
shown that it can be dangerous to rely 
on outside analysts, who may suffer from 
conflicts of interest. Thus, departments of 
transportation must build up their own, 
in-house expertise to ensure they can fully 
examine the terms of an agreement before 
signing any long term deals.
Third, states must develop a systematic 
approach to evaluating privatization pro-
posals. If states continue with their ad hoc 
approach, it is likely that important public 
interest concerns will be neglected. State 
governments could adopt the model used 
in other countries, such as Australia, where 
officials are required to impose certain 
standards for each agreement, such as 
ensuring transparency, examining the ef-
fect on regional mobility, and protecting 
equity concerns. The U.S. Secretary of 
Transportation should assist in this process 
by developing and submitting criteria for 
identifying the national public interest in 
privatization agreements.
Finally, the federal government must 
modernize its approach to transportation. 
The Federal Highway Administration and 
the U.S. Department of Transportation 
should take a more active role in regulating 
privatization projects, even when federal 
funds are not used. Privatization agreements 
with interstate implications, for example, 
must be rigorously evaluated by the federal 
government to ensure the interests of the 
nation as a whole are protected. Further-
more, the federal government needs to en-
sure that private financing is not being used 
to bypass important federal regulations, 
such as environmental and labor laws. 
These general approaches to privatiza-
tion agreements will help ensure that the 
public interest is protected. However, the 
state and federal governments need to 
honestly examine their methods of priva-
tization and adopt systematic approaches 
to ensure the national public interest is 
safeguarded in all agreements.
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Principles to Ensure 
Any Deal Protects the 
Public Interest
Public officials considering privatization 
proposals must screen those proposals us-
ing public interest criteria and also compare 
the costs and benefits of those proposals 
with the cost and benefit of public financ-
ing and operation. For “green field” deals 
to build new roads, public officials should 
specify exactly how private entities might 
add value, and whether those more limited 
tasks might be outsourced while retaining 
broader public control and financing.
Basic public interest principles can pro-
tect against bad privatization deals. The 
following six guidelines can help public 
officials distinguish a lemon of a privatiza-
tion deal from one that might provide real 
value to the public: 
• The public should retain control over 
decisions about transportation plan-
ning and management. 
• The public must receive fair value so 
future toll revenues won’t be sold off 
at a discount. 
• No deal should last longer than 30 
years because of uncertainty over future 
conditions and because the risks of a bad 
deal grow exponentially over time. 
• Contracts should require state-of-the-
art maintenance and safety standards 
instead of statewide minimums. 
• There must be complete transparency 
to ensure proper public vetting of 
privatization proposals.
• There must be full accountability in 
which the legislature must approve the 
terms of a final deal, not just approve 
that a deal be negotiated. 
Transparency and accountability will 
force public officials to face difficult ques-
tions. Public officials will be less likely to 
embrace road sell-offs as an “easy out” 
if they are forced to evaluate the plans 
against these public interest principles. As 
the GAO notes, “there is no free money in 
public-private partnerships.”126 
Increased transparency can reduce the 
risk to the public of agreeing to a long-
term private toll road deal. Other measures 
– such as requiring private toll road opera-
tors to share a portion of their profits if 
proceeds exceed anticipated levels – can 
also safeguard the public from risk. 
By challenging privatization proposals 
to financially outperform what the public 
sector could produce with the same bor-
rowing and toll increases, privatization 
proposals can be evaluated more pragmati-
cally. Promised operational efficiencies 
can be evaluated on their own terms. And 
ideological claims that assert infrastructure 
privatization will “unlock the dormant 
value of public assets,” can be understood 
as little different from taking out a second 
mortgage on one’s home.
If it is established that the public toll road 
authority or other public special-purpose 
entities can deliver better financing than 
private bidders, this still does not mean 
that public “securitization” of future tolls 
is a good idea. It should be evaluated the 
way any bond issuance or other borrowing 
would be: by judging whether the benefits 
of upfront investments would outweigh the 
longer-term finance burden.
Similarly, when considering any poten-
tial privatization deal, it is important to 
spell out exactly where privatization would 
be expected to generate increased value. 
Government agencies may lack certain 
kinds of technical expertise – for example, 
the capacity to install or manage electronic 
toll collection systems or implement cer-
tain new bridge-building techniques. The 
government may even have less ability 
to contain construction costs. Once the 
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specific public shortcomings have been 
identified, it will be possible to consider 
whether the government might outsource 
those activities separately or whether it 
would be cost efficient for the public sector 
to build those capacities in-house.
For existing toll roads, there simply are 
not enough potential efficiency gains for 
toll concession deals to advance the public 
interest. It is harder to make overall assess-
ments of potential deals for new road con-
struction through private companies that 
would claim future toll revenues. There 
is more potential for upsides, but also far 
more potential risks for the public. In either 
case, no private deal should go forward 
unless the government is certain that the 
identified benefits can not be purchased 
separately and that the benefits truly out-
weigh the many associated downsides of 
road privatization.
Finally, the federal government must 
take a more active role in overseeing all 
privatization agreements that have national 
implications. Factors such as interstate 
commerce must be considered to ensure 
that we maintain a well-coordinated and 
logical interstate highway system.
For a detailed listing of completed and proposed privatization projects 
by state, please download Appendices B and C of this report, available 
at www.uspirg.org/road-appendix.
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Appendix A  
Compensation and Non-Compete Clauses in Privatization Agreements
STATE	 TOLL	ROAD	 COMPENSATION	CLAUSE
California	 CA	125	 The	agreement	prevents	the	state	from	building	or	improv-
ing	competing	roads	that	were	not	already	included	in	the	
state’s	20-year	plan.	A	provision	was	included	to	require	
the	state	to	compensate	the	private	operator	if	such	ac-
tions	were	taken.
Colorado	 Northwest	Parkway	 The	concession	agreement	contains	a	compensation	clause	
requiring	the	highway	authority	to	compensate	the	con-
cessionaire	if	any	unplanned	road	or	transit	projects	are	
built	in	the	corridor	and	hurt	revenues.	If	the	authority	
can’t	pay,	the	private	entity	can	keep	any	revenue	sharing	
money,	increase	tolls	beyond	limits,	or	extend	the	lease.	
Currently	the	state	is	considering	a	proposed	realignment	
and	extension	of	West	160th	Avenue,	which	the	concession-
aire	considers	a	“probable	adverse	action”	necessitating	
compensation.	The	highway	authority	claims	this	project	
does	not	violate	the	compensation	clause.
Colorado	 E-470	 Commerce	City	signed	a	non-compete	agreement	with	the	
toll	authority	requiring	them	to	intentionally	slow	traffic	
on	the	nearby	Tower	Road.	The	speed	limit	was	changed	
to	40	mph	from	55	mph,	and	traffic	lights	were	added	at	
three	intersections,	including	on	a	dirt	road.	The	restric-
tions	were	eventually	rescinded	and	the	speed	limit	was	
raised	to	50	mph,	though	the	traffic	lights	remain.
Indiana	 East-West	Toll	Road	 Indiana	is	required	to	pay	the	investors	for	reduced	toll	
revenue	when	the	state	performs	construction	on	the	
road.
Texas	 SH	130	Segments	5&6	 The	contract	includes	a	provision	that	TxDOT	will	pay	
Cintra-Zachry	for	lost	profits	if	state	projects	reduce	toll	
traffic,	such	as	the	widening	or	building	of	competing	
roads.	The	state	can	earn	credit	for	pushing	traffic	to	the	
toll	road,	such	as	by	lowering	the	speed	on	I-35.
Virginia	 Capital	Beltway	 The	state	is	required	to	compensate	the	concessionaire	
for	lost	toll	revenue	if	the	number	of	HOVs	encroach	upon	
tollable	capacity	beyond	a	certain	threshold.
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